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Abstract: During the last two decades, discourses over the transition process shifted toward  
a theoretical diversity and a deeper understanding of ‘how modernity was reworked in post-
socialist context’. It was widely argued that changing social relations were shaped not only by 
norms and institutions of Neoliberal capitalism, but also by established networks, institutional and 
regulatory structures and actors that/who gave diverse responses to the profound and thorough 
transformation of the society. This paper aims at understanding how geopolitical discourses over 
the Balkan and its place in the ‘new Europe’ shaped social relations and produced daily practices 
nested into those webs, through the perception and interpretations of post-socialist transformation 
by Hungarian migrants who left the war-hit Yugoslavia. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE DIVERSITY OF POST-
SOCIALISM  
During the last two decades, a large body of academic work has been done to 
study, interpret and theorise post-socialism. Discourses that were stimulated by 
and also did produce the transition process shifted toward a theoretical diversity 
and a deeper understanding ‘how modernity was reworked in post-socialist 
context’ (Smith, 2004). Modernisation theory that underpinned political and 
academic discourses, and largely shaped the transformation process in the 
former ‘Soviet bloc’ considered ‘marketisation’ (the Neoliberal scheme for 
transition) and ‘democratisation’ inevitable and as a process of ‘returning to 
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Europe’ and a development model (Hörschelmann, 2004). In this context, the 
EU-accessions in 2004 and 2007 were considered as the completion of the 
transition process (i.e. construction of the institutions of well-functioning 
markets and political democracy) and the successful repositioning of post-
socialist countries inside Europe by the national political elites of the accessing 
countries and also in political rhetoric of the EU-technocrats (Clark, 2001; 
Moisio, 2002; Kostovicova, 2004).  
This ‘orthodox’ approach was successfully exploited by national elites for 
governing and legitimising the transition process (i.e. institutionalising the 
Neoliberal market economy and making the high price of it paid by the majority 
of post-socialist societies accepted) (Smith, 1998). Nevertheless, it was increas-
ingly criticised by academics, particularly, for ignoring different (‘socialist’ and 
‘pre-socialist’) development trajectories and the diversity of social processes of 
the emerging capitalism in the post-socialist countries (Smith and Pickles, 1999; 
Smith, 2004; Stenning and Hörschelmann, 2008). It was widely argued that 
changing social relations were shaped not only by norms and institutions of 
Neoliberal capitalism, but also by ‘established networks, institutional and 
regulatory structures and actors operating under conditions of extreme uncer-
tainty and chance [of the transition]’ (Pickles and Smith, 1999, p. 119) that/who 
gave diverse (capitalist/non-capitalist, formal/informal/illegal) responses to the 
profound and thorough transformation of the society. Thus, post-socialist spaces 
should be considered as highly complex webs of relations that can be understood 
through everyday experiences and practices (Smith, 2004; Stenning and Brad-
shaw, 2004; Stenning and Hörschelmann, 2008).  
By taking the latter, non-essentialist view of post-socialist transition and of 
emerging diversity of capitalism in the former ‘Soviet bloc’, this paper aims at 
understanding how discourses over the transition shaped social relations and 
produced daily practices nested into those webs, through the perception and 
interpretations of post-socialist transformation by Hungarian migrants who left 
the war-hit Yugoslavia (dominantly, the multi-ethnic Vojvodina region, North 
Serbia). It shall be analysed how post-socialist discourses over the nation-state, 
ethno-cultural relations, and the contested idea of Europe shaped their lives, in 
particular, their relations stretching over national boundaries. It is difficult to 
estimate the number of Hungarians who moved to Hungary and particularly, 
those who still stay there. Thus, discussing their views, practices and reflections 
on post-socialist discourses might be considered as marginal. Nevertheless, this 
group constructed a highly complex web of social relations and a multi-layered 
identity rooted in their ethno-cultural relations, in their ‘migrant past’ tied 
closely to experiencing war, nationalisms and uncertainty of the transition, 
moreover, in the particular trajectory of Yugoslavia as a ‘socialist’ state, that 
makes us understand the ‘multiple and differential strategies’ that were at work 
in post-socialist societies (Smith and Pickles, 1999). The transition process shall 
be discussed through the lens of migrant entrepreneurs under post-socialism.  
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To understand how post-socialist discourses shaped complex networks of 
social relations and everyday practices of this social group, the political conflicts 
of the Balkan shall be discussed in the geopolitical context of the transition 
(section 2). Interpreting geopolitics as ‘…a discoursive practice by which 
intellectuals of “state-craft” spatialise international politics in such a way as to 
present it as a “world” characterised by particular types of places, peoples and 
dramas’ (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992, p. 192), re-definition of the nation 
(interwoven with ethno-cultural problems), moreover, the re-positioning of post-
socialist states in Europe shall be interpreted as tools of national political elites 
to support and legitimise the transition process (Smith, 1998; Moisio, 2002; 
Kostovicova, 2004). The conflicts of the former Yugoslav states that have been 
discussed in a wider geopolitical and historical context (e.g. by Ó Tuathail, 
1999; Jackson, 2004; Kostovicova, 2004) shall be interpreted also as part of 
national and local political discourses in Hungary and Szeged (a border-town 
receiving migrants from Yugoslavia in a large number during the 1990s), that 
largely shaped the ‘material’ conditions1 of and attitudes toward immigrants. 
The analysis rests on the review of earlier studies focused on the Balkan 
conflicts, moreover, on the survey and evaluation of discourses over the mean-
ings of the nation and national borders in the programmes of Hungarian political 
parties, in national media, moreover, in local politics (Szeged), through semi-
structured interviews (18) made with local politicians and intellectuals.  
Geopolitical discourses over the transition did shape the perception, interpre-
tation of rapid and profound changes of post-socialist societies and the responses 
given by the particular social groups. This process shall be discussed in 
section 3, through the analysis of semi-structured lifetime interviews made with 
immigrants who moved from the former Yugoslavia to Hungary during the 
1990s, consider themselves Hungarian (that is their native language), and ran 
successful business(es) at the time of the interview (2006–2007). Due to the 
difficulties in finding them (for that, I used the ‘snowball’ method) and their 
reluctance to give an account of their life, only 8 interviews were (could be) used 
for the analysis. During the one-and-a-half/two-hour conversations, I focused on 
understanding the turning points their lives, the meaning of those events and 
their relations to post-socialist discourses, discovering and understanding the 
context of narratives related to Europe, nation, ethno-cultural identity, the 
history of the region, and to Neoliberal capitalism. In this way, the everyday 
practices that rest on diverse social networks, including formal and informal, 
local, global and cross-border were revealed to contribute the ongoing discourse 
over the diversity of capitalism (and of the transition process itself) in the former 
‘Soviet bloc’.  
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2. THE BALKAN WARS IN THE ‘NEW EUROPE’ DISCOURSE  
From the late 1990s on, academic research shifted from considering post-
socialist transition as series of institutional reforms toward a deeper analysis and 
understanding how ‘almost the entire fabric of life’ was re-defined (Young and 
Light, 2001, p. 2) and how spatial frameworks of everyday practices were 
reorganised. It was widely discussed that the nation state had a substantial and  
a multi-faceted role in this process, not only as a provider of ‘material’ condi-
tions (institutions) for the changing systems of social reproduction, but also as  
a spatialised framework of belonging (identity) in a highly uncertain and rapidly 
changing world (Anderson, 1991; Paasi, 2001; Young and Light, 2001; Jackson, 
2004). Nevertheless, dissolving the state control over everyday life was  
a significant issue in post-socialist political discourses, thus, the role and the 
values and norms that the nation state rested upon had to be re-defined thor-
oughly in post-socialist countries. This process was tied intimately to the issue of 
being part of Europe (Moisio, 2002; Kostovicova, 2004): in post-socialist 
political rhetoric, it represented the ‘return’ to democratic traditions, historical 
continuity (rejecting the socialist past, stressing the ‘modern’ and ‘western’ roots 
of the sovereign, territorialised nation state) and also adopting a model for 
‘working capitalism’ to remedy the crisis of post-socialist restructuring (Young 
and Light, 2001; Paasi, 2001; Moisio, 2002; Ziegler, 2002). Nevertheless, free 
trade and well-functioning market economy raised also the issue of changing 
meanings of national borders due to globalisation, rise of network economies 
and intensified cross-border relations (Paasi, 2001) – questioning the signifi-
cance of a pillar (the territorialised nation state) that ‘newly born’ post-socialist 
identities rested on (Young and Light, 2001). 
The repositioning of post-socialist countries in the political space was em-
bedded into the discourses over the idea(s) of Europe, in (and through) which, its 
meanings (as a ‘place’, based on shared history and values, and also as an 
‘institution’, i.e. the EU) were re-interpreted, and the changing sense of na-
tion/nationhood was widely discussed throughout Europe (Paasi, 2001; Simon-
sen, 2004). The spread of terms of the ‘new Europe’ and ‘East and Central 
Europe’ in geopolitical discourses – that largely shaped ongoing debates in post-
socialist countries – rested on the idea of including post-socialist countries in 
Europe as a place and also as an institute (the EU) (Moisio, 2002; Clark, 2002). 
Nevertheless, it referred also to the process of ‘othering’: the exclusion of ‘… 
backward, violent, extremely nationalist countries…’ (Simonsen, 2004, p. 358), 
and (re-)defining Europe as a bounded space, primarily, in relation to Russia 
(Moisio, 2002; Simonsen, 2004). Such discourses manifested in including post-
socialist countries in Europe as an institute (Paasi, 2001), that resulted in highly 
complex and overlapping structures of spaces and boundaries, that (particularly, 
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being included in/excluded form the ‘common market’, the euro-zone, and the 
Schengen system) largely shaped the everyday practices of people living border 
regions (Walters 2002).  
Moreover, the EU-accession of post-socialist states raised fear and political 
debates inside the ‘old’ EU-member states, that resulted in the re-definition 
(reinforcement) of the role of nations states (as territorialised power) in control-
ling international flows, particularly, migration (Simonsen, 2004; Houtum and 
Pijpers, 2007; Cunningham, 2004). Thus, Neoliberal globalisation and the end of 
the Cold War resulted in the development of highly complex networks and flows 
crossing the national borders as well as the boundaries between the former ‘East’ 
and ‘West’, but produced complex, overlapping (bounded) spatial structures, and 
new meanings of traditional (e.g. national) boundaries.  
While the nation-state was re-defined through geopolitical discourses engi-
neered by the political elites, as a source of identity and stability in post-socialist 
countries with well-functioning institutions for exercising power and control 
social practices, it raised conflicts that have been inherent in multi-ethnic post-
socialist countries under ‘Socialism’ and before (Mitchell, 2000; Young and 
Light, 2001). Political conflicts that escalated to wars on the Balkan were widly 
discussed and interpreted in this context (e.g. by Ó’ Tuathail, 1999; Young and 
Light, 2001; Jackson, 2004; Kostovicova, 2004). Yugoslavia was interpreted as 
a permanently contested political framework that rested on the dual ideology of 
(national) independence and (ethnic) togetherness that provided a framework for 
subsequent attempts for modernisation. Due to the failures of the centrally 
planned system, inner conflicts were managed by shifting the economic and 
political power to the national (party) elites from the 1970s on, providing an 
institutional (and economic) basis for the centrifugal forces, that emerged 
(firstly) as series of ‘inner’ political struggles (federalism vs. centralisation), and 
escalated to ethnic/national and military conflicts (Sajti, 1995; Jackson, 2004). 
For ‘secessionist’ republics of Yugoslavia, modernisation (tackling the structural 
crisis) was close-knit to the issue of national sovereignty – being released from 
an ‘outworn’ centrally planned system and political oppression of the Commu-
nist Party (increasingly dominated by anti-reformist Serb and Montenegrin 
politicians from 1989) – and to the issue of European integration. Nevertheless, 
as post-Yugoslav republics were highly diverse in ethnic and cultural terms, the 
rise of nationalisms and the construction of culturally homogenous nation states 
by national political elites challenged and made sources of (war) conflicts all 
‘other’ (ethno-cultural) identities tied to particular places and landscapes 
(Brubaker, 1998; Robinson et al., 2001; Jackson, 2004).  
Discourses over national identities and boundaries in the former Yugoslavia 
were embedded into and shaped by the geopolitical debate over the Balkan and 
its place inside the ‘new Europe’. Since the geopolitical significance of Yugo-
slavia was shrinking at the end of the Cold War, conflicts in the West Balkan 
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were not considered of strategic importance in the early 1990s. Thus, the 
escalating war was considered as something happening ‘outside’ Europe, placing 
the ‘Balkan’ as a geopolitical category outside the democratic world. The 
‘othering’ of the war-hit countries split former Yugoslavia politically and 
spatially (i.e. into the militant Yugoslav/Serb state vs. republics seeking for 
sovereignty/adopting ‘European values’) (Ó Tuathail, 1999; Sajti, 1995). As  
a consequence, after the Balkan wars, Yugoslavia’s/Serbia’s role had to be re-
defined as European, and as a democratic country, and also as a territorialised 
nation state on the Balkan,2 that made Serbia’s European integration a highly 
contested process (Kostovicova, 2004).  
The wars and the ambiguity of the national borders changed the socio-spatial 
framework of everyday life of people living in multi-ethnic border regions of the 
Balkan thoroughly. In Tito’s Yugoslavia, the ethnically and culturally diverse 
space of Vojvodina was defined as part of (North) Serbia. Nevertheless, it 
gained a limited autonomy, and until the late 1980s, despite the rise of Serb 
nationalism and ‘cutting back’ the autonomy of the region, local people had 
learnt how to deal with economic problems and how live in a multicultural 
milieu. The region was increasingly embedded in international flows before 
1990: the residents of Vojvodina were over-represented amongst Yugoslav guest 
workers, and many local people benefited from semi-legal activities (e.g. form 
blooming open markets that were mediators of also smuggled and faked goods, 
and frequented by Hungarian shoppers), that eased social problems stemming 
from the crisis of centrally planned economies3 (Gulyás, 2007). In this period, 
social conflicts that were scarcely considered as ‘ethnic’, were managed and 
resolved through local personal networks.  
Nevertheless, from the early 1990s on, the region was a scene to major ethno-
cultural changes. Although, it was hit directly by the fifth Balkan war (by the 
NATO bombing in 1999), major demographic and ethno-cultural changes 
occurred from the early 1990s on: 300,000 residents left Vojvodina, of whom, 
50,000 were Hungarians, while Serb families from war-hit regions were arriving 
up till the end of the Kosovo conflict (Sajti, 1995; Szlávity, 2007). Outward 
migration of Hungarian minority (that targeted primarily Hungary) was stimu-
lated by the fear of the war (of being enlisted in the Yugoslav army), and also by 
the economic crisis. Highly qualified, young and mobile groups of the popula-
tion (e.g. former guest workers) were highly over-represented amongst migrants, 
who exploited the opportunities of cultural (language) community and of the 
emerging market economy, saving their small capitals from hyperinflation of the 
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of Montenegro, and to the hotly debated status of Kosovo.   
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 Such transactions were tolerated and even (indirectly) supported by the relatively liberal 
regulation of cross-border flows (on both sides) between Hungary and Yugoslavia.  
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war economy (Nagy et al., 2003; Szlávity, 2007). These changes challenged the 
identities that were tied intimately to particular places and largely destroyed 
networks of (localised) social relations developed and worked as framework of 
everyday social practices until 1990s, it was suggested by the interviews.  
3. A GATE ON THE FORTRESS? GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSES OVER THE 
‘NEW EUROPE’ AND THE BALKAN CONFLICTS IN HUNGARY  
The rise and escalation of the political (politicised ethnic) conflicts on the 
Balkan raised political debate, controversial reactions and frustration in Hun-
gary, that was embedded into the geopolitical discourses over repositioning the 
country inside Europe and the global political and economic map. While ‘Euro-
Atlantic’ integration was a key issue supported by all political forces, the re-
reading of the pre-socialist national history that underpinned this process 
ideologically resulted in diverse interpretations of the nation. By the proponents 
of neoliberal modernisation (including successors of the pre-1989 Socialist 
Party), it was defined as the product of post-socialist modernisation process, 
associated with sovereignty, controlled by the territorialised nation state that 
rests on the loyalty of its citizens, and (as member of European institutions)  
a potential supporter of Hungarian minorities living outside the national borders. 
In the other ‘mainstream’ (‘rightist’, conservative) interpretation, the nation was 
defined as an ethno-cultural community that rests on shared history and values 
stretching over the boundaries of territorialised nation states of the region. This 
discourse raised subsequent waves of fear of ‘Hungarian revisionism’ of borders 
in the neighbouring states, and political tensions in Hungarian borderland 
communities (outside Hungary), of whom many felt ‘being used’ by Hungarian 
national parties in geopolitical discourses.  
Nevertheless, despite the ongoing debate over the interpretations of the na-
tion, actual political decisions were driven by the interests of the political elite to 
legitimise the transition process through Euro-Atlantic integration. Due to this, 
as the Balkan crisis deepened and was perceived as a challenge for the ‘New 
World Order’ by the USA (Ó Tuathail, 1999), and Hungary was considered as  
a potential partner of the NATO in the intervention, just after joining the Treaty 
in 1999, a Hungarian aircraft basis was used for bombing Serbia, including 
Vojvodina. The ethno-cultural concept of the nation was challenged again in 
2004, when a referendum was organised by the conservative political parties to 
get support (legitimacy) for offering dual citizenship for Hungarians living 
outside the national borders. This attempt failed due to the low level of participa-
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tion and to the rejection of the proposition by the majority of voters.4 Thus, the 
concept for the nation that saw the resolution for the problems of ethno-cultural 
relations and of national borders in being integrated into Europe as a framework 
for intensified (cultural, economic etc.) flows prevailed, and underpinned the 
‘mission’ taken by Hungarian foreign policy to take a leading role in integrating 
the Balkan into European institutions.  
In the southern border region of Hungary, that was considered as a ‘periph-
ery’ by the national and local media and discussed in the context of war, crime, 
threat and migration in the 1990s, local geopolitical discourses were embedded 
into a dense network of relations and daily practices connected to the Yugo-
slav(Serb)-Hungarian border, as it was suggested by the interviews conducted in 
Szeged. Although, there was an increasing fear of the ‘side products’ of the war, 
such as the rise of criminal offences, the growth of the illegal economy, and the 
entry of new agents (immigrant entrepreneurs) on the highly contested and 
shrinking market of retail and services (all together, labelled as the ‘Balkanisa-
tion’ of the local economy and society in Szeged), the benefits of the changing 
geopolitical situation was also perceived. The local economy was stimulated by 
the influx of small capitals from Yugoslavia that were fuelled into small scale 
joint ventures and the local property market. This process was underpinned by 
the liberalisation of the conditions of enterprising and of property transactions5 
in the early years of the transition in Hungary.  
The local political elite aimed at repositioning Szeged in the ongoing national 
and international geopolitical discourses, to exploit it geographical (dis)advan-
tages and the existing dense economic, cultural and personal cross-border 
networks. Local politicians were increasingly considered with being an engine of 
‘making peace’ and of the re-negotiation of the Balkan’s role in Europe. This 
‘mission’ was inspired largely by the changing (peripheral) position of Szeged in 
the emerging uneven landscape of capitalism. Thus, the future of the city was 
discussed in its geopolitical (borderland) context, as it was articulated by  
a senior official of the City Hall (2001): 
The development of Szeged might have stimulating impact in a wider [i.e. North Balkan] 
region […]. Catching up with the rest of the country and marching into Europe.  
The ‘gate to the Balkan’ was an inverse interpretation of the city’s earlier 
position (being a ‘dead end’) up until 1999. This new interpretation rested on the 
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 The (probably, convincing) arguments against this concept were very similar to those used in the 
old EU-member states to protect their welfare systems and labour markets in the enlarged EU. 
5
 The lower limit for the registered capital of a company without legal entity took one-tenth of the 
average monthly salary in 1992. International investors, primarily, Yugoslav ‘small capitals’ were 
involved in one-sixth of local businesses in the region at the peak of such flows (1994). Joint 
ventures were allowed to own a property in Hungary, thus, having a home for immigrants.  
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changing geopolitical position of the Balkan (cease-fire, and latter, the involve-
ment of Yugoslavia/Serbia in European institutions), as well as on the knowl-
edge and social capital accumulated in cross-border networks before and even 
during the ‘five wars’ of the Balkan. Nevertheless, the vision rested upon 
asymmetrical relations: Szeged (Hungary) was to take the leading role in 
integrating ‘the Balkan’ (considered as the ‘other’ of European working capital-
ism and democracy) economically and politically into Europe. This role rested 
on the position of the city in the ‘New Europe’ (and of Hungary as a NATO-
member, as a candidate for EU-membership etc.), and also on the cultural and 
economic functions fulfilled in Southeast Hungary and the North Balkan before 
the First World War. However, in general terms, local strategies that were 
embedded into international geopolitical discourses, rested also on the dense and 
multi-layered networks of social relations that crossed the border under social-
ism (in the 1980s) and post-socialism.  
4. GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSES AND THE CHANGING FRAMEWORKS OF 
EVERYDAY LIFE 
Under the conditions of post-socialist transition that resulted in profound 
changes and uncertainty in everyday life, being part of a localised network of 
social relations, moreover, belonging to a nation was source of stability. Such 
frameworks of identity and social practise were challenged deeply and thor-
oughly by the war conflict in Yugoslavia, particularly, for those who had to 
leave the place used to be attached to. For the interviewees, the ‘trauma’ of the 
war (or just the fear from being involved in it) that forced them to cross the 
border (flee from home) was a turning point in their lives. Nevertheless, this 
change was interpreted also as a ‘new beginning’ that rested largely on relation-
ships ‘back home’ (a source of stability emotionally and economically), and also 
on the opportunities of the liberalised market economy in Hungary.  
Starting a ‘new life’ under the conditions of the transition crisis of the early 
1990s was largely a question of means of living. Thus, enterprising (suc-
cesses/failures related to it) was key issue for immigrants, as a material basis for 
being part of the society, and also a source for new social relations.6 They had to 
run their businesses in a rapidly changing environment, and their failures (as 
businessmen) exhibit all the characteristics of post-socialist transition, such as 
semi-lawful business operation as a business strategy, vulnerability, and lacking 
business ethic and strategic partners. In seeking for stability in their emerging 
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 Very often, the story of the interviewees was structured (e.g. chronologically) by the milestones 
of constructing their businesses. 
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business relations, the interviewees interpreted the Yugoslav/Hungarian border 
(considered as a manifestation of national identity and territorial power by 
national political elites, and a ‘wall’ separating two worlds in the ‘new Europe’ 
discourse) in a very practical way. It was seen permeable, limitations of crossing 
it were considered as problematic, but temporary and manageable. Thus, social 
relations ‘back home’ and those crossing the border were maintained, and 
supported the momentums of leaving Yugoslavia, settling down, and running 
businesses.  
 
I left that company [a family business in Szeged], and came to live here [his current place of 
residence] to establish this company. I had a huge number of international contacts. I built up  
a system of which I became the exclusive representative in Serbia.7 At the time, things didn’t go 
well at the company. But I felt responsible for the people that I’d recruited (Peter, entrepreneur, 
moved to Hungary in 1995). 
When we came over, friends and acquaintances, who lived here [in Szeged], helped a lot. 
These were friendships of long-standing. Some 15–20 years old...8 (Joseph, entrepreneur, left the 
country in 1991). 
 
The national border worked also a source of capital accumulation during the 
years of the Balkan wars. The process rested on actual knowledge provided by 
the network including ‘home relations’ (in Yugoslavia) and other migrants in 
Hungary, moreover, on social capital accumulated in the 1980s, when intra-
Yugoslav trade was blossoming.  
 
We already had a dormant company here [i.e. in Szeged, at the time of settling in Hungary]. 
We rented an apartment and an office, and found a job […]. Then came the war, which severed 
commercial relations in Yugoslavia. The status of the Vojvodina, which had supplied Slovenian 
and Croatian manufactures, also changed. The company was quick to join intermediary commerce; 
as a Hungarian company we made re-exports to the West Balkans, and were important business 
partners of large international companies […]. Szeged was a bridge head for multinationals. They, 
too, relied on us9 as an intermediary in their exports to the Balkans. Then came the embargo of the 
UN Security Council against Yugoslavia. We quickly contacted NGKM,10 got an export licence 
for certain foods and other processed products. We also supplied manufacturers in Serbia. Demand 
was huge.’ (Gabriel, entrepreneur, moved to Hungary in 1991) 
Personal relations that crossed newly defined national borders as well as 
ethno-cultural boundaries in the Balkan, provided a framework for involving the 
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 It was a multi-level marketing scheme, a commercial enterprise based on sole trader distributors.  
8
 He met and made friends with quite a number of Hungarians through his business operations on 
the Yugoslavian side of the border in as early as the 1980s.  
9
 Hungarians with Hungary-based enterprise, having an extensive personal network throughout the 
former Yugoslavia.  
10
 Hungarian Ministry of International Business Relations, a ministry in charge of international 
business relations during the Antall Government (1990–1993). 
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war-hit regions in the international division of labour, through flows people 
(labour), knowledge, information and (from 2000 on) of capital. Such networks 
of relations that rested on trust stemming from local networks supported 
strategic responses of immigrant businessmen to the rapid changes of the 
liberalised Hungarian market (i.e. the entry of international competitors). 
 
A turning point in the business operations was when a friend of the family, a representative of 
a company in Zagreb, who had excellent connections in Italy, offered to sell machinery for the 
XXX company at a reasonable price. We had 24 hours to make up our mind. We agreed because 
the security of the business was a main concern. We didn’t want to put all our eggs in one basket. 
We needed a manufacturing unit in case retail opportunities ran out of steam… (John, entrepre-
neur, moved to Hungary in 1991). 
In the beginning we had five employees. Skilled labour was hard to come by. Back home 
[i.e. in Vojvodina] it was different. Operation was round-the-clock there. Then in 1993 the war 
in Bosnia broke out and young men came. They wanted a job, so we were able to operate 
24hours per day to fulfil the YYY transnational retailer’s order. Then a friend of one of our 
employees came over from Szabadka (Subotica), he took over professional oversight. It was he 
who had introduced all the innovations. He was the engine of growth. We owe him a lot 
(Quotation form John again). 
 
Geopolitical discourses over the ‘New Europe’ in which Milosevic’s Yugo-
slavia was considered as Europe’s ‘other’, did effect he everyday life of the 
interviewees, even though, they left the country before/during the wars and were 
hit by that heavily. They perceived this ‘othering’ in business relations as  
a symbolic border between Western Europe and the countries of the former 
‘Soviet bloc’ (e.g. in choosing partners by ‘western’ firms). To overcome it, they 
employed a spatial strategy that rest on Hungary’s relatively good image in 
constructing international bussines relations through Hungary-based firms. 
However, it was also stressed, that the view of ‘Yugoslavia’ was differentiated 
along ethno-cultural characteristics: entrepreneurs’ from Vojvodina (particularly, 
Hungarians) were considered as ‘more reliable partners’ in the ‘West’.  
Considering Yugoslavia as militant state in geopolitical discourses and the 
fear of the war did shape the social relations of the interviewees locally: they felt 
being ‘outsiders’, even ‘suspected’ of having criminal (immigrant) relations, that 
made developing local networks of relations slow. However, in general, cultural 
differences between the migrants and the receiving society (community) were 
considered essential in this process:  
 
Hungarians take quite a while to acknowledge foreigners. We have first hand experience in 
this. The language also reflects this. It {i.e. the Hungarian language} has not changed in centuries 
[…]. We have Vojvodian mentality; we wine and dine guests, because, who knows, some day  
I might be their guest, needing their hospitality. You won’t find that mentality among the 
Hungarians (Jon, entrepreneur, settled in Hungary in 1995).  
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The interviewees related such differences to the multi-ethnic environment 
they came from, where being open to otherness’ was a key issue for living 
together. Such experiences made them develop a highly complex system 
relationships as a source of stability under the uncertain conditions of post-
socialist transition, war, and being an immigrant.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The emerging social networks and daily practices of people who left behind the 
war-hit place and community they used to belong to, were shaped largely by 
ongoing geopolitical discourses. Nevertheless, building up a ‘new life’ that was 
tied closely to running a business to live on, rested on relationships that crossed 
the boundaries defined through geopolitical discourses designated by national 
political elites and European technocrats. Perceiving the globalisation of the 
Hungarian market, they developed a complex web of international relations, that 
rests on values and norms of the ‘West’, but underpinned also by Neoliberal 
market opportunities produced by the post-socialist transition (as an integration 
into European/global flows) and by the largely personalised relations ‘back 
home’, as capital assets to be exploited (cheap/skilled labour, investment 
opportunities etc.). This process rooted deeply in the multi-ethnic milieu that 
they are still strongly attached to (emotionally and through personal ties) and 
that made them open-minded, moreover, in the development path of the border 
region (particularly, the Vojvodinian side) characterised by relatively intensified 
flows of people, goods and information before the transition. Social networks 
stretching over the national boundaries remained sources of stability after the 
war (from 2000 on), nevertheless, the distinction between the business and 
personal relations became more pronounced, and criticism concerning national 
borders as products of geopolitical discourses were replaced by scepticism 
toward Europe as an institute, and a framework for maintaining (reinforcing) 
uneven development through defining a complex set of boundaries.  
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